31![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part II: Beyond Smoothness and XOS Valuations ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014 CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part II: Beyond Smoothness and XOS Valuations ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/e4aad90082ebcd1acb5e689ea2ad1462.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2014-05-13 09:33:25
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32![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15, CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/920ebd76f9bf764b57a7c2fcee0ea8e5.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2014-01-27 13:39:49
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33![PRIOR-INDEPENDENCE: A NEW LENS FOR MECHANISM DESIGN A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES PRIOR-INDEPENDENCE: A NEW LENS FOR MECHANISM DESIGN A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/d93071402005efafe8730e6981389ffd.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com- Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:37
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34![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #20: Characterization of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 12, 2014 CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #20: Characterization of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 12, 2014](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/0b287f9c5ecd24a894f975bb90e3ff11.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2015-01-30 15:19:36
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35![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part I: Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions Revisited ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014 CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part I: Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions Revisited ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/2dc3d92420ed90c4db8a9ce9d92207b9.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2014-05-13 09:28:58
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36![2 Equilibrium The theory of equilibrium attempts to predict what happens in a game when players behave strategically. This is a central concept to this text as, in mechanism design, we are optimizing over games to find g 2 Equilibrium The theory of equilibrium attempts to predict what happens in a game when players behave strategically. This is a central concept to this text as, in mechanism design, we are optimizing over games to find g](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/3dfe039b706baaeff725d7d4e8ae73ab.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: jasonhartline.com- Date: 2016-01-19 15:44:49
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37![Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/fd40837fa5f894652110882ad1326ca3.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.tik.ee.ethz.ch- Date: 2015-05-18 12:16:23
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38![Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap Qiqi Yan∗ Department of Computer Science Stanford University October 19, 2010 Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap Qiqi Yan∗ Department of Computer Science Stanford University October 19, 2010](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/c9d97773f866c52bec8af3bb0c028394.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com- Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:36
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39![Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/f8900d1889336ba639d667e4b2b32caf.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu- Date: 2003-06-14 11:29:11
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40![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #9: MIDR Mechanisms via Scaling Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 5, CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #9: MIDR Mechanisms via Scaling Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 5,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/b1e47c74ec86f15e2170961acf0d3a16.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2014-06-11 16:23:57
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